2.8

Adjusted Signal

2.8

Raw Pattern Score

100%

Time Factor

2026-10-30

Last Push

6.9K

Stars

TypeScript

Language

118.0K

Lines of Code

201

Files

226

Pattern Hits

2026-10-31

Scan Date

0.04

HC Hit Rate

Risk Review · Payload v1

Use each vector to guide manual verification of the underlying findings.

Payload schema: 1.0.0 · Engine: 2.0.0 · Scoring: heuristic-density-v1 · Scan date: 2026-10-31.

Cognitive Ownership Risk 6.7/100 · LOW

Can maintainers explain intent, assumptions, and trade-offs? 179 finding(s).

Hallucinated Dependency & Supply Chain Risk 2.2/100 · LOW

Are imports declared and package/API names verified? 10 finding(s).

Agent Over-Engineering Ratio 8.7/100 · LOW

Are wrappers, guards, and repeated structures necessary? 150 finding(s).

PR Review Velocity Impact 13.5/100 · LOW

Which changes need focused human review? 226 finding(s).

What These Metrics Mean

Adjusted Signal: Legacy pattern score normalized per 1,000 scanned lines and multiplied by the repository-level time factor. It is not an estimate of AI authorship.
Raw Pattern Score: Sum of severity- and context-weighted pattern findings before applying the time factor.
Time Factor: A coarse multiplier based on repository last-push metadata. It does not identify when individual code was written.
Pattern Hits: Count of configured pattern findings. Review each location and surrounding code before acting.
HC Hit Rate: High- and critical-severity findings per scanned file. Severity is a configured detector weight, not proof of a vulnerability or authorship.
Lines / Files: Scan coverage denominators used by the legacy normalized score.

Pattern-Signal History

This chart tracks the legacy adjusted pattern score across scan runs. Changes can reflect source changes, scan coverage, or detector/scoring versions; they do not measure AI adoption or prove that a team refactored code. Compare runs only when their scoring versions are compatible. The dashed line tracks the raw pattern-hit count.

Severity Breakdown

Groups findings by configured severity weight. Severity is not a confidence estimate, security rating, or proof that a package is missing. Verify imports against the project's manifests and inspect each finding in its local design context.

CRITICAL 0HIGH 8MEDIUM 38LOW 180

Directory Score Breakdown

This horizontal bar chart shows where configured pattern scores accumulate across directories. Treat the bars as locations to inspect, not as evidence of authorship or code quality. Use the file-level findings to decide whether a directory needs a focused ownership, dependency, complexity, or review check.

Pattern Findings

The scanner identified 226 distinct pattern matches across 8 syntactic categories. Each entry below represents a discrete location in the source code where the engine recorded a detector match to inspect in context. Expand any category row to inspect the individual file paths, line numbers, code snippets, and the lexical context (CODE, COMMENT, or STRING) in which each match was detected.

Reading the findings table: The Severity column indicates the configured finding weight (CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW). The Context column identifies whether the match occurred inside executable code, an inline comment, or a string literal — legacy comment-context matches receive a ×1.5 score weight. The ⚡ bolt icon marks clustered matches: three or more patterns within a 10-line window, each receiving an additional ×1.5 density multiplier under the legacy scoring model.

Decorative Section Separators37 hits · 112 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	1191	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	1193	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4682	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4684	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4704	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4706	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4755	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4757	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4882	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4884	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4919	// ── loopback port-range fence ────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4952	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	4954	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5018	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5020	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5245	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5247	// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5975	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5977	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	6289	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	6296	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	.github/workflows/integration-tests.yml	221	# ─── Windows: srt-win helper binary ─────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/cli.ts	185	// ── Windows install/uninstall ─────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM⚡	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4356	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM⚡	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4358	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	63	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	65	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	200	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	202	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	672	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	674	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	799	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	801	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	1083	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	1085	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4138	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT
MEDIUM	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4140	// ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────	COMMENT

Hyper-Verbose Identifiers113 hits · 102 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
LOW	test/config-validation.test.ts	420	function expectSlashedDenyGlobRejected(spelling: string): void {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/tls-terminate-handshake-deadline.test.ts	135	async function expectDestroyedAtDeadline(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/http-proxy-verdict-liveness.test.ts	273	async function clientSupportsHalfOpenReceive(): Promise<boolean> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1088	function wrapCarveOutThroughOutsideLink(command: string): Promise<string> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1125	function wrapAllowReadLinkToDeniedDir(command: string): Promise<string> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1170	function wrapAllowReadLinkToDeniedFile(command: string): Promise<string> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1429	function wrapLinkBackUpToWriteRoot(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1537	function wrapDenyWriteThroughDeniedDir(command: string): Promise<string> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	1773	async function wrapUninspectableLinkTarget(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/read-deny-glob.test.ts	2004	function wrapFileLinkBeneathDeniedDir(command: string): Promise<string> {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	191	function nestedWriteRootsUnderTmpfs() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	246	function tmpfsInsidePinnedAncestor() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	373	function carveOutInsideSymlinkSpelledDenyRead() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	438	function symlinkedAllowReadCarveOuts() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	510	function carveOutsOverDeniedTargets() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	872	function pinsInsideWriteDeniedDirectory() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	952	function pinnedCorridorBelowCarveOut() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	1005	function denyLeafUnderNestedCarveOut() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	1285	function maskInsideRestoredWritePath() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	1343	function carveOutInsideEmittedDenyDir() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	1398	function maskOverAllowWriteOfTheSameFile() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin.test.ts	1929	function readDeniedDirAboveNestedRepo() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts	609	async function runSandboxedWriteWithGitConfig(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts	713	async function runSandboxedWriteWithDenyPaths(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/mandatory-deny-paths.test.ts	1461	async function runSandboxedCommandWithDenyPaths(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/readonly-deny-dir-stubs.test.ts	770	async function wrapWithFailingRootListings(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/readonly-deny-dir-stubs.test.ts	892	async function wrapWithUnresolvableRootChild(	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/integration.test.ts	44	function assertPrecompiledBpfInUse(): void {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-mount-plan-record.test.ts	364	function carveOutUnderSymlinkedParent() {	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/proxy-only.test.ts	1090	async function probeClientSendsPathAsGiven(): Promise<boolean> {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-violation-store.ts	145	export function sanitizeUnregisteredCommandKey(decodedKey: string): string {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/read-deny-glob.ts	31	function collapseReadDenyLocations({	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/emitted-connection.ts	30	export function overrideEmittedConnectionProbe(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/emitted-connection.ts	48	export function assertTlsTerminationSupported(): void {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	61	export function normalizeCaseForComparison(pathStr: string): string {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	166	export function containsGlobCharsForPlatform(p: string): boolean {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	403	export function collapseInteriorSpellings(pathPattern: string): string {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	1225	export function encodedCommandFromProxyUser(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/tls-terminate-proxy.ts	758	export function serverNameFromClientHello(record: Buffer): ServerName {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	288	function findFirstNonExistentComponent(targetPath: string): string {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	441	export function linuxGetCwdMandatoryDenyPaths(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	542	async function linuxGetMandatoryDenyPaths(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	673	function ensureEmptyMountSourceDir(): string {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	726	export function processHasBoundingCapability(cap: number): boolean {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	758	export function boundingCapabilitiesFromStatus(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	1128	function registerExitCleanupHandler(): void {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	1513	export async function initializeLinuxNetworkBridge(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	1731	function resolveApplySeccompPrefix(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3532	export async function wrapCommandWithSandboxLinux(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/body-substitution.ts	107	export function createBodySubstitutionTransform(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	103	export function macGetMandatoryDenyEntries(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	551	function generateReadDenyUnlinkRules(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	822	function generateMoveBlockingRules(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	1412	export function wrapCommandWithSandboxMacOS(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	1627	export function startMacOSSandboxLogMonitor(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	249	function assertWindowsSrtWinCapable(srtWin: SrtWinSpawn): void {	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	285	export function windowsProfileReadWarningsOf(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	502	function releaseWindowsSessionAcls(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	571	function registerCommandNetworkLists(	CODE
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	623	function unregisterCommandNetworkLists(commandId: string): void {	CODE
53 more matches not shown…

Cross-Language Confusion (JS/TS)8 hits · 50 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
HIGH	test/sandbox/linux-bridge-burst.test.ts	33	print('%s made=%d late=%d' % (name, len(made), late))	CODE
HIGH	test/sandbox/macos-allow-local-binding.test.ts	56	print('IPC', cli.recv(2).decode())	CODE
HIGH	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	64	print('in-the-sandbox-namespaces:', replace())	CODE
HIGH	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	67	print('new-namespaces: ok')	CODE
HIGH⚡	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	78	print('in-its-own-namespaces:', replace())	CODE
HIGH⚡	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	80	print('new-namespaces: refused %s at %s' % (name(e.errno), e.strerror))	CODE
HIGH⚡	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	89	print('unix-socket: made')	CODE
HIGH⚡	test/sandbox/linux-nested-userns.test.ts	91	print('unix-socket: refused', errno.errorcode.get(e.errno, e.errno))	CODE

Over-Commented Block57 hits · 46 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
LOW	test/sandbox/glob-expand.test.ts	81	// Use raw path for creation, real path for assertions	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/readonly-deny-dir-binds.test.ts	241	},	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/winsrt.test.ts	5981	// CHILD trusts the proxy-minted certs	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/integration.test.ts	521		COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/proxy-only.ts	161	mitmCA,	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	461	if (getPlatform() === 'windows') {	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	501	normalizedPath = path.resolve(process.cwd(), pathPattern)	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	781	// send Proxy-Authorization automatically. Only the sandbox child sees this	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	861	? `http://${auth}localhost:${httpProxyPort}`	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-utils.ts	1681	// other: about e*n!), and the sets of positions a tree can lead to are as	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	521		COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	541	// (checked again at write time via readableEnded). EOF	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	561	//	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	701	endWithStatus(rawDenied(...allowlistDeny, reason))	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	721	// canonicalization fails, so the two layers can never disagree.	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	981	})	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/http-proxy.ts	1081	!mitmSocketPath &&	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/request-filter.ts	221	let forUpstream: Readable = req	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/mitm-leaf.ts	61	{ name: 'subjectKeyIdentifier' },	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/tls-terminate-proxy.ts	1021	// Host-header note below).	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/tls-terminate-proxy.ts	1101	}	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	661	// Track mount points created by bwrap for non-existent deny paths.	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	1801	// Default to bash for backward compatibility	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2001	/** Where a path's name lives (nameLocationOf in the caller). */	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2121	// uncreatable, and must not get a /dev/null stub: bwrap would have to	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2141	// Planned like the others, so that their ancestors are pinned and counted	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2201	return canonical === p ? [p] : [p, canonical]	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2281	// Where that mount lands, which is where the entry really is: one mount	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2321	return {	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2381	// Shallow-first by canonical depth, so a tmpfs over a directory lands	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2441	// Every path here is a name, and normalizePathForSandbox strips a	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2621		COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2681	let spellings = readOnlyDenyDirSpellings.get(resolvedPath)	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2701	// lands after the buffered read-only binds, so a covering bind is the	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2721	// anything inside such a path at all, and it restores read-only,	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2761	isStrictlyUnder(allowedPath, denyDir),	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	2781	// It does still COVER a candidate outside every predicted	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3081	// The read-deny mounts emitted so far, in emission order: directories	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3121	// What the pattern matches beneath an allowed path in there was never	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3141	// Every location the read section hides, each one where its mount lands:	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3281	// at the same place — where the path really resolves, which is what	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3321	let dir = path.dirname(denyWriteArgs[i + 2]!);	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3461	// INVARIANT: the fake-file store directory must never be writable from	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/linux-sandbox-utils.ts	3801	bwrapArgs.push('--dev', '/dev')	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	921		COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	941	// This means file deletions are blocked even in write-allowed directories like	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	1261	//	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/macos-sandbox-utils.ts	1521	// JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS carries two things for JVMs in the sandbox:	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	201	// so a config change between init and reset can't strand ACEs	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	1201	logMonitorShutdown = startMacOSSandboxLogMonitor(	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	1341	throw e	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	1541	const muxPort = needLocalProxy	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	2641	// Network PROXY is needed whenever network config is specified	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	2661	//	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/sandbox-manager.ts	2821	customConfig?.credentials ?? config?.credentials,	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4201	// outside the proxy-port PERMIT range — so NO_PROXY makes clients	COMMENT
LOW	src/sandbox/windows-sandbox-utils.ts	4241	// (USERPROFILE/TEMP isolated) and overlays exactly what we pass as	COMMENT

Verbosity Indicators4 hits · 6 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
LOW	test/sandbox/macos-seatbelt.test.ts	393	// Step 1: Try to rename the denied directory	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	82	// Step 1: Verify sandbox correctly blocks writes outside workspace	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	108	// Step 2: Create symlink /tmp/claude -> /	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	132	// Step 3: Verify sandbox still blocks writes outside workspace	COMMENT

Structural Annotation Overuse4 hits · 6 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
LOW	test/sandbox/macos-seatbelt.test.ts	393	// Step 1: Try to rename the denied directory	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	82	// Step 1: Verify sandbox correctly blocks writes outside workspace	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	108	// Step 2: Create symlink /tmp/claude -> /	COMMENT
LOW	test/sandbox/symlink-boundary.test.ts	132	// Step 3: Verify sandbox still blocks writes outside workspace	COMMENT

Modern AI Meta-Vocabulary1 hit · 2 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
MEDIUM	README.md	9	> The Sandbox Runtime is a research preview developed for [Claude Code](https://www.claude.com/product/claude-code) to e	CODE

Fake / Example Data2 hits · 2 pts

Severity	File	Line	Snippet	Context
LOW	test/sandbox/credential-mask-files.test.ts	647	b64u('{"sub":"1234567890","name":"John Doe","iat":1516239022}') +	CODE
LOW	test/sandbox/linux-ancestor-pin-errno.test.ts	129	const fakePath = join(proj, 'fake-token')	CODE

anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime

Open-Source Code Quality, Security and Technical Debt Review